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Protecting the Chemical Sector

By Steven G. King

The US Department of Homeland Security (DHS) currently is focusing on security in the chemical industry, specifically chemical facilities, in large part because of the potential for significant economic and human health consequences from a successful attack on a critical chemical facility.

The chemical sector-with nearly one million employees and $500 billion in annual revenue-is an integral component of the U.S. economy, converting various raw materials into more than 70,000 diverse products, many of which are critical to the health and well-being of the nation's citizenry, security, and economy. While the contributions the chemical sector makes to the nation are expansive, they do not come without risk, as the economic and strategic value of the industry makes it an attractive target for terrorist activity. Moreover, many chemicals, either in their base form or when combined with others, can cause significant injuries to humans and damage to the environment if used maliciously. Yet there are no federal laws requiring that chemical facilities adhere to security regulations, and authorities must rely on voluntary compliance.


Current Programs
DHS works to secure the chemical sector by a variety of programs. Since 9/11, members of the chemical industry have helped to create an entirely new type of risk analysis, one that recognizes a deliberate and intelligent enemy. Traditional risk methods have never accounted for this kind of 21st century threat. But now, many in the chemical industry have developed screening methods and security best practices that help to reduce or eliminate some types of vulnerabilities at their sites. Some have also taken other steps- like investing in new security infrastructure and capabilities, implementing new procedures, and in many cases, complying with new rules, whether industry standards or state and local laws - all in effort to protect against this new kind of threat.

The DHS has likewise been making investments in the communities that house this infrastructure - providing funding and training to improve policing capabilities, emergency response, consequence management and community planning. And the Administration has requested additional funding in the FY 2007 budget proposal to promote chemical site security.

Vulnerability assessments are underway for the nearly 300 sites that could potentially affect more than 50,000 of local surrounding populations. To date, DHS officials have engaged most of these sites by conducting a variety of assessments (DHS does not have the legal authority to force corrections to most deficiencies we find. That is the reason why the Department is asking Congress for regulatory authority).
The Department continues to visit these facilities on a priority basis in coordination with the state Homeland Security Advisors, state and local law enforcement, and site owners and operators. Prior to the formation of the Department there were limited safety inspections of chemical facilities conducted by a variety of federal infrastructure protection authorities. Today, security needs are being addressed and coordinated across the federal government by the Department through numerous Site Assistant Visits (SAVs) and the Buffer Zone Plans (BZPs) in which Homeland Security personnel assist and advise site owners, operator, and security managers in making their facilities more secure.

DHS is enhancing sector-specific information sharing and coordinating mechanisms for all of the 17 critical infrastructure sectors, incorporating both Information Sharing and Analysis Centers (ISACs) and Sector Coordinating Councils (SCCs). These entities have dual roles serving as central points of information sharing within each of the sectors and acting as the liaison to the federal government. One of the primary functions is to funnel threat information to facilities and receive and collect information from facilities. The Chemical Sector ISAC has supported Homeland Security's information sharing efforts since the Department's inception and includes more than 650 representatives from more than 430 different chemical companies.

The Chemical Sector ISAC uses CHEMTREC, the chemical industry's 24-hour emergency communication center as the communication link between the Department and ISAC participants. When CHEMTREC receives information from DHS, that information is immediately transmitted, on an around-the-clock basis, to Chemical Sector ISAC participants utilizing electronic mail and a secure website.

The Future of Chemical Security
The Chemical Sector-Specific Plan, now under development as part of the National Infrastructure Protection Plan (NIPP) process, will contain the operational detail for actions necessary to achieve the strategic goals and objectives need to reduce risk in the chemical sector. DHS, in conjunction with other federal, state, local, and private sector security partners, must work collaboratively to develop and implement the Chemical Sector-Specific Plan. The Department will soon have this plan completed and implementation will occur within the next six months.

Unfortunately, DHS and its Federal security partners are limited in what they can do to secure the chemical industry as there is no overarching federal regulatory authority regarding chemical sector security. To address this issue, legislation has been introduced in each of the last three Congressional sessions that would provide DHS with such power, yet each time Congress has failed. As a result, chemical sector security currently is primarily performed through voluntary actions taken by the chemical facilities themselves.

While many companies have taken this responsibility quite seriously and spent significant resources enhancing the security of their facilities, not all companies have done so. As a result, the nation is being held hostage by those few who have not undertaken the responsibility that they have to make sure their facilities are secured to an appropriate level. Now, four years after the horrific events of 9/11, DHS is pushing for legislation that will provide it with all encompassing regulatory authority for chemical sector security without delay.

In their most recent Congressional sessions, leaders in both the Senate and the House of Representatives have proposed legislation to address this gap. Senators Susan Collins (R, ME) and Joseph Lieberman (D, CT) have been at the forefront of this effort, and the Department has been working with them to put together a sensible and appropriate bill that would give it the regulatory authority it needs to ensure the proper level of security is maintained in the chemical sector while attempting to minimize the burden on the national economy.

Speaking in front of the National Chemical Security Forum on March 21, 2006, Secretary Michael Chertoff discussed the need for chemical security legislation, outlining the three strategic principals DHS believes are vital for a successful chemical security regulatory system:

  1. Use a risk-based approach to focus effort appropriately
  2. Emphasize performance standards, not specific protective measures, to provide facility owners and operators flexibility regarding the protective measures they implement
  3. Reward voluntary activity already undertaken by responsible facility owners

A risk-based approach
Like most other critical infrastructure or key resource sectors, the chemical sector includes infrastructure that is spread across the entire spectrum of risk - from small operations that are not very consequential and likely are not targets of terrorist interest, to major manufacturing centers where a successful terrorist attack could significantly affect the regional or national economy, as well as public health. Given the varied risks associated with different chemical facilities, and the limited resources which are available to secure our nation's entire infrastructure, a one-size-fits-all approach is not appropriate for chemical industry security. Rather, we must focus available resources on those facilities that pose the highest risk.

To support proper resource allocation , DHS believes that any regulatory approach should incorporate the use of risk tiering to determine what security standards a given facility should have to meet. By examining the components of risk-consequence, vulnerability, and threat-associated with individual chemical facilities, we believe we will be better able to focus our finite resources on those facilities that most need them, without requiring unduly strong security standards for facilities whose risk level simply does not warrant the additional expenditures on security. As Secretary Chertoff stated in his speech to the National Chemical Security Forum:

“We have to recognize that there are different levels of risk for different types of operations, and we have to focus what we demand, in terms of performance and in terms of security, based upon the level of consequences that we are concerned about.”

Performance Standards
Consistent with the recognition that a one-size-fits-all approach is not appropriate for the chemical industry, DHS believes that the use of performance standards, instead of mandating specific protective measures, should be emphasized wherever possible. In a sector such as the chemical sector with extremely diverse facilities, there are few, if any, specific protective measures that would help mitigate the consequences or reduce the vulnerabilities associated with all facilities in a cost-effective manner. Rather, individual owners and operators should have the flexibility to develop a responsible combination of layered security programs and measures to meet their specific facilities' needs, so long as those measures collectively reduce risk to an acceptable level based on the facility specific risk profile.

By using performance standards instead of specific protective programs, an individual company can best leverage its policies, procedures, and capabilities to get to a desired end result. This will give owners and operators the flexibility to put together the right combination of measures to fit the unique characteristics and security challenges associated with their facilities and individual situations while still ensuring that they achieve the desired level of security and risk reduction

Recognize Voluntary Activity
Since 9/11, many responsible companies in the chemical industry have already moved forward on their own to enhance security at their facilities. To both reward those facilities that have done so and minimize any additional burden on industry, DHS believes that chemical security legislation should “credit” facility owner/operators already operating under federal or state rules or voluntary private-sector security schemes that meet the performance standards established by the Department. Such “credit” would be predicated upon certification by the owner/operator that the facility is in compliance with existing regulations, or in compliance with a voluntary security program that accomplishes the desired risk reduction goals, and verification of compliance by DHS or a third-party auditor. By acknowledging and rewarding voluntary efforts, DHS hopes to encourage similar behavior throughout the chemical industry, and other industries as well.

Establishing a regulatory regime based on these three strategic principles will increase chemical sector security with minimal additional burden on the owners and operators of chemical facilities. For the sake of our nation's security and continued prosperity, the Department of Homeland Security strongly encourages Congress to enact legislation providing the Department with the regulatory authority to implement such a security regime.



Steven G. King is the Director of the US Department of Homeland Security's Chemical Security Office, tasked with leading all federal chemical security programs. The Chemical Security Office works with the intelligence community to evaluate and understand domestic threats to the chemical sector, as well as coordinating the implementation of chemical security initiatives. In addition, he is an adjunct instructor at George Washington University, and conducts research on bio-terrorism at George Mason University.

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